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Hybrid Organizations as
Shape-Shifters:





Social entrepreneurs navigate a complex landscape of legal structures in which they need to select among for-
profit, nonprofit, and mixed-entity structures. This study of 48 hybrid organizations identifies why social entrepre-
neurs chose one legal structure over another and explains what motivates half of them to change their legal
structure as they build their enterprise. It highlights the critical desire for flexibility among social entrepreneurs,
discusses the implications that changes to legal structure may have for companies and hybrids in partnerships,
and explores how companies can leverage hybrid structures to go beyond their current scope of CSR initiatives.
(Keywords: Hybrid Organizations, Social Enterprise, Business Models)
Hybrid organizations are unique in their need and ability to traversenonprofit/for-profit legal structures. Runa, a hybrid organizationthat produces Guayasa beverages and supports Ecuadorian farmers,has gone through several changes to its legal structure since its
founding in 2008. Guayasa trees grow in the Ecuadorian Amazon, and for gener-
ations Ecuadorians have made a drink from its caffeinated leaves. After visiting
Ecuador and witnessing ineffective development projects and deforestation, CEO
Dan Macombie and his business partner Tyler Gage designed Runa as a for-profit
company with a mission of supporting Guayasa farming communities by purchas-
ing Fair Trade Guayasa to produce beverage products. According to Macombie,
soon after establishing the for-profit they added a nonprofit to ensure their suppli-
ers understood Runa’s social mission: “Originally, the supply chain in Ecuador
was under the nonprofit because we believed that that was necessary for commu-
nicating our social mission to farmers.” However, after realizing the farmers did
not mind whether they traded with a for-profit or nonprofit and that managing
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suppliers through a nonprofit “was not a very effec-
tive way of doing business,” Macombie and Gage
transitioned their suppliers to the for-profit. Today,
the for-profit “focuses on building a supply chain
for Guayasa,” while the nonprofit “focuses on
socio-economic research and program development,
reforestation…and agricultural ecological research…
in conjunction with the farmers.” The types of
changes to legal structure experienced by Runa are
common, and among the 48 hybrid organizations
we studied, 24 had made comparable changes or
were anticipating them imminently.
We use the term hybrid organization (or hybrid) to refer to enterprises that
mix aspects of for-profit and nonprofit realms1 to solve specific social or environ-
mental issues while striving to remain economically sustainable.2 On a continuum
ranging from pure traditional for-profit companies at one end to pure nonprofit
charities at the other, hybrids occupy the intermediate points in between.3
Hybrids are also labeled social enterprises,4 and we use the terms interchangeably.
Similarly, entrepreneurs building hybrid organizations are called hybrid entrepre-
neurs5 or social entrepreneurs, which Bacq and Janssen6 define as entrepreneurs
whose objective is to create social value from entrepreneurial behavior.
Stemming from their dual focus on social and economic goals, social entrepre-
neurs have three broad options for their legal structure: a for-profit structure that
integrates a strong social mission;7 a nonprofit structure that earns some or all of its
revenue; and what we call a “mixed-entity” structure that associates a for-profit with
a nonprofit through ownership, contracts, donations, or other means. Sidebar 1
provides examples from our dataset of each type of hybrid structure.
Sidebar 1. Examples of Each Type of Hybrid
Structure
For-Profit Hybrid—Nerd Fitness is a U.S.-based company founded by
Steve Kamb. He was a keen online gamer who understood the social
dynamics in the gaming community, and the pressures to keep playing
rather than getting out and exercising. He was also a fitness advocate
who had come to believe that the online fitness industry needed an over-
haul. As Kamb put it, “anywhere you turn online, it’s people promoting
drinks and specific pieces of workout equipment…there’s a lot of really
bad information out there.” In response, he developed a health regime
to which gamers could relate and built an online community around it.
To ensure he was not contributing to the issues he saw in the online fit-
ness industry, Kamb decided not to advertise or to let others advertise
on the Nerd Fitness website, and he continues to build the business
through word-of-mouth. He saw an opportunity that would provide him
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with business income while building a community of “people that are inter-
ested in staying nerdy but also need help with trying to get healthy.”
Nonprofit Hybrid—Project Have Hope exemplifies one case in a well-
established trend of nonprofits earning revenue to supplement or replace
other revenue streams. To some this trend is questionable,a while others
see it as a necessary response to an insecure funding environment.b Project
Have Hope operates under the U.S. IRS’s nonprofit 501(c)(3) category
and seeks to help the Acholi women of Uganda build their own enter-
prises and educate their children by facilitating the online sale of jewelry
and other products they make. Rather than seeking donations to fund its
operations, founder Karen Sparacio decided that Project Have Hope
would earn its own revenue through buying or consigning the hand-made
products and listing them for sale on its website. Proceeds of the sales go
to the women, provide working capital for Project Have Hope, and fund
programs and partnerships in Uganda. One such partnership is with Uganda
Child Cancer Foundation, which is funded through a “Hope Cures” jewelry
collection. Project Have Hope’s website mentioned that: “One dollar from
each Hope Cures bracelet purchased is donated to UCCF to provide emo-
tional, financial and social support, and mobilize resources to improve the
children’s quality of life.”
Mixed-Entity Hybrid—Souktel is a Ramallah-based mixed-entity hybrid
that has developed a text-based (SMS-based) job information platform that
enables job seekers to connect with organizations looking to hire in regions
where access to internet and smartphones is limited. Organizations that are
seeking to hire pay Souktel to post an ad, which it distributes to job seekers
via text, and interested job seekers respond via text. Souktel began as a
U.S.-registered for-profit corporation, but an opportunity arose to develop
software that assists the distribution of humanitarian aid. The organization
added a Canadian-registered nonprofit entity so that, in the words of co-
founder Jake Korenblum, “we could more effectively deliver services or imple-
ment technology for exclusively humanitarian purposes in settings where a
for-profit model didn’t really make sense.” Souktel’s website now reflects
the expanded mission of designing and delivering “custom mobile solutions
that connect job seekers with employers, and help development implement-
ers get information to and from the people they serve.” The for-profit man-
ages the mobile platform and works with clients, while the nonprofit
partners with humanitarian aid organizations, develops software to assist their
activities and distributes it at below market cost. Since its founding in 2006,
Souktel has reached over half a million mobile phone users in 12 countries
and has raised over $1 million in venture capital funding.
a. A.M. Eikenberry and K. Jodie Drapal, “The Marketization of the Nonprofit Sector: Civil Society at Risk?”
Public Administration Review, 64/2 (March 2004): 132-140.
b. J. Kickul and T.S. Lyons, Understanding Social Entrepreneurship: The Relentless Pursuit of Mission in an Ever
Changing World (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012); L. Moeller and V. Valentinov, “The Commercialization
of the Nonprofit Sector: A General Systems Theory Perspective,” Systemic Practice and Action Research,
25/4 (August 2012): 365-370.
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Having three broad options from which to choose and deciding which is
best for a hybrid organization can be complex enough, but there is also growing
complexity among for-profit options. In addition to traditional for-profit registra-
tion categories (such as LLC and C-Corporation in the U.S.), in some regions
hybrids may also register as one of several new for-profit categories serving enter-
prises with dual social-economic missions. Sidebar 2 describes these categories.
Sidebar 2. New Business Registration Categories for
Social Enterprises
In an increasing number of U.S. States and in the UK, new for-profit
categories are available to enterprises emphasizing a dual social—economic
purpose. These categories were created in response to requests from social
entrepreneurs and their allies to help meet the unique needs of hybrid
organizations. These categories are variations of existing for-profits, and
depending on the circumstances may not only suit for-profit hybrids, but
also those that would traditionally register as nonprofit. In the U.S., these
structures differ by state and include variations of the Limited Liability
Company (LLC) (e.g., Low-Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C) and
Benefit LLC), and variations of the corporation (e.g., Benefit Corporation
and Flexible Purpose Corporation). At the time of writing, 27 U.S. states
had enacted such legislation and it had been proposed in a further 14.a
These new categories are part of a dynamic landscape—in January 2014,
North Carolina abolished its L3C category (after introducing it in 2010)
on the grounds of it not being necessary.b Across the Atlantic, the UK intro-
duced the Community Interest Company (CIC) in 2005—a designation that
LLCs with primarily social objectives can request. CIC profits are reinvested
into its operations rather than being distributed to owners. To date, over
4000 CICs have been registered.c
a. B-Lab, <http://bcorporation.net/>, accessed November 4, 2014.
b. A. Field, “North Carolina Officially Abolishes The L3C,” Forbes, January 11, 2014.
c. “Regulator of Community Interest Companies,” Annual Report 2012/2013, <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243869/13-p117-community-interest-
companies-annual-report-2012-2013.pdf>, accessed December 28, 2013.
The complex landscape in which social entrepreneurs design hybrid organ-
izations prompted us to ask ‘What drives the founders of hybrid organizations
when choosing their initial legal structure?’ Our study identified 13 drivers that
involve a mixture of personal and strategic motives for choosing a for-profit, non-
profit, or mixed-entity structure. After learning of changes to structure among the
first three hybrids we initially studied, we added a further research question: Why
do hybrid organizations change their legal structure? Half of the 48 hybrids we
studied had or were about to alter their legal structure, with many shifting to
become mixed-entity hybrids.
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The legal structure ultimately chosen by social entrepreneurs has implications
for both the enterprise and its stakeholders. Beyond basic for-profit and nonprofit
constraints—such as the inability of nonprofits to distribute earnings for private
benefit, while for-profits generally do not access grant or philanthropic fund-
ing8—a hybrid’s structure influences its partnership opportunities. There are a
growing number of social partnerships and social alliances between nonprofits
or hybrids and traditional firms to carry out corporate social responsibility
(CSR) and corporate sustainability initiatives.9 Companies collaborate with
hybrids because they see value in their partner’s contribution and expect some
kind of benefit themselves.10 Partnerships are built based on their likelihood of
producing collective strength and legitimacy, the degree of interdependence,
and low potential for conflict.11 The legal structure adopted affects which types
of partners (e.g., government agencies, companies, and NGOs) might be willing
to work with the enterprise to resolve a focal social issue, and changes to that
structure may have implications for an existing partnership.
One organization that articulates the possibility of altering its value proposi-
tion to partners is MTI Integrated Business Development, Inc. (MTI IBD). MTI IBD
is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit based in New Jersey that helps injured veterans overcome
employment and community integration barriers through its work restoration pro-
gram Jobs2Vets. MTI IBD trains veterans through its catering, greenhouse, driving
range, and other revenue-generating operations, and its website reports that it “is a
consultant to the Veteran Affairs New Jersey Health Care System’s (VANJHCS)
Department of Homeless Services.” When we interviewed CEO Wendell Knight,
he was working on placing the revenue-generating activities within a for-profit
subsidiary of the nonprofit, but was thinking deeply about its potential effect on
MTI IBD’s existing relations with Veteran Affairs:
“People tend to be less suspicious of you when you are doing these types of revenue
generating interests as a not-for-profit, as when you are doing it as a for-profit they
tend to be much more suspicious of you. So it’s a vetting process for people getting
to know who you are and getting to trust you and I find it to be very difficult.”
Our results provide insights into what drives social entrepreneurs to choose
and then change their legal structure, and indicate how such changes can alter the
value that firms get from partnerships with hybrids. In addition to this, our results
carry insights for companies wanting to deepen their own CSR commitment
beyond partnerships. The hybrid organizations we examined were designed to
address social issues, and traditional firms wanting to advance their CSR program
could leverage hybrid structures to do so.
Methodology
The complexity of the legal structure landscape and lack of in-depth
research in the area indicated that qualitative methods were appropriate for this
study.12 We developed 48 case studies of hybrid organizations. Hybrids were
recruited through global snowball sampling13 of self-identified social entrepre-
neurs who had founded or managed a hybrid organization. In a field that has
Hybrid Organizations as Shape-Shifters: Altering Legal Structure for Strategic Gain
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 57, NO. 3 SPRING 2015 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 63
no central registry or large database of participants, this sampling technique
helped us identify a range of hybrid organizations and allowed for a natural
depiction of the field.14 We first recruited social entrepreneurs known to us,
and then others using LinkedIn and Twitter. In each interview, we asked partic-
ipants to refer us to other hybrid organizations. Table 1 provides a breakdown of
the cases in terms of types of organization, the issues on which they focused, and
countries in which they were operating.
The cases consist of transcripts or field notes from interviews with founders
or senior managers, follow-up e-mails, archival documents, and website content
(data collected are summarized in Table 2). We conducted at least one interview
for each case, by either phone or Skype, and recorded them when permitted. We
performed content analysis of all data using NVIVO qualitative analysis software
and used pattern-matching techniques15 to identify and interpret emergent drivers.
Our initial coding identified 38 drivers of initial choice and changes to legal struc-
tures. Further pattern-matching analysis and discussion among the researchers facil-
itated by spreadsheets reduced the number of drivers and attributed drivers to one or
both decision points. The final list in Table 2 contains 13 drivers of initial choice and
11 drivers of structural change, which we report further below in the results.












22 Employment for the poor, promotion of
sustainable lifestyles, providing
telecommunications in low-income areas,
childhood nutrition, food security, animal
welfare, community revitalization and
localization, obesity, development of
medical devices for developing countries,
and support for sustainable small businesses,




Nonprofit 14 Employment (for veterans, youth, refugees,
people with disabilities, mental health or
substance abuse issues, and dependents of
soldiers), charter school management,
support for cancer patients, preventing
migration of local entrepreneurs, providing
materials for under-resourced teachers,
support for Ugandan craftswomen, and






11 Infant mortality, employment (for veterans,
the poor), support for women in business,
support for local artisans, support for
indigenous farmers, support for Amazonian
communities, etiquette and financial training





Undecided* 1 Support for local performance artists USA
Total 48
* Although this participant had not yet established their enterprise (and so we were not able to collect data about the type
of legal structure ultimately chosen), they did provide useful data regarding what was driving their decision.
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Interviews and follow-up e-mails were valuable for identifying primary,
secondary, and tertiary reasons for choosing the initial legal structure of each
hybrid, and where applicable the reasons for changes made to that structure. In
most cases, multiple drivers influenced choices of initial structure and changes.
Through coding and discussion, we ranked the drivers using a weighted system,
where primary drivers were assigned 3 points, secondary 2 points, and tertiary 1
point. The results of this analysis form Appendix A. In cases where the rank of
drivers was initially ambiguous, we revisited the data and further discussed and
justified our individual coding to arrive at an agreed order. We captured websites
at the time of interview, and website content and archival documents expanded
our understanding of each hybrid’s current legal structure, history, operations,
goals, the issue they sought to address, and mission relating to that issue.
All but one hybrid was legally registered at the time data were collected
(we retain the unregistered enterprise in the sample, because the entrepreneur
was still able to provide insights about what was driving his decision process).
Of our 48 case studies, 24 had changed their structure or were changing immi-
nently. Figure 1 illustrates the changes occurring within and between for-profit,
nonprofit, mixed-entity structures,16 and shows that mixed-entity structures are
an increasingly popular choice among hybrids.
What Drives the Initial Choice of Legal Structure?
We found that social entrepreneurs choose their initial structure for a wide
variety of strategic and personal reasons. There were 13 drivers of the initial
choice of legal structure. Table 3 ranks these drivers and highlights whether they
relate to organizational strategy, personal factors surrounding the founder, or
both. The drivers are not mutually exclusive, and combinations of them often
led founders to choose or alter their legal structure. Common combinations of
drivers are highlighted in the descriptions below where applicable.
Up to this point, the assumption has been that social entrepreneurs choose
their legal structure strategically to preserve tax benefits (for nonprofits) or social




Senior managers with substantial detailed knowledge of decision making at founding
Senior manager with good working knowledge of decision making at founding






Follow-up e-mails with interviewees
Brochures, press releases, business plans, and other documents
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impact,17 or gain access to capital and other resources.18 However, our findings show
the picture to be significantly richer than first assumed.We found that the prevalence
of personal and strategic drivers was balanced when making initial choices about
legal structure.While strategic drivers like the need to raise capital and desire to facil-
itate the mission were most common, personal drivers like fit with founder values
and identity and previous experience also played a large role in decision making
about initial legal structure. In addition to this, as predictable as it might be that the
need for capital ranked highly, it is perhaps equally unpredictable that other financial
considerations—such as tax and the generating revenue—ranked significantly lower
than onemight expect. In the following, we explain the top five drivers of initial legal
structure choice listed in Table 3. These five drivers were significantly more common
than were drivers ranking below them.
Desire to Facilitate the Mission
The most dominant driver shaping the structure of hybrid organizations we
studied was the desire to find optimal ways to facilitate the mission. Social entrepre-
neurs believed that a particular structure was the best strategic vehicle for serving
their mission. One social entrepreneur that chose to remain anonymous shared by
e-mail that when initially starting their organization, “I insisted on our being a




































* Darker shaded areas within the for-profit and nonprofit categories indicate where hybrids
changed legal structure but remained within their original structure type. Seven for-profits
changed: Four switched to other for-profit structures, and three established second or third
for-profit entities. Four non-profits changed: Two merged with larger non-profits, and two estab-
lished second nonprofit entities.
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nonprofit because I was trying to change philanthropy. I wasn’t trying to prove that
you couldmakemoney and do good. Our goal is to change the way the world tackles
poverty.” In this case, the goal of changing how philanthropy tackles poverty dictated
that nonprofit was the best choice. Souktel (described in Sidebar 1)was similarlymis-
sion-driven. Souktel started life as a for-profit because the founders saw it as the best
vehicle to facilitate their mission of connecting job seekers with jobs. In an interview,
co-founder Jake Korenblum indicated that this mission was a strong driver in all
their start-up decisions: “we really started out by focusing on the core issue, which
remains our core focus, which is the job information platform.”
TABLE 3. Drivers of Initial Legal Structure Choice




1. Desire to Facilitate
Mission
The legal structure would best
support the mission of the
organization.
Strategic 42
2. Need to Raise Capital The legal structure would allow
initial capital to be raised most
effectively.
Strategic 38
3. Fit with Founder
Values/Identity
Social entrepreneur(s) had a specific
preference that aligned with their
values and/or identity.
Personal 37
4. Perceived Expedience Social entrepreneur(s) believed the





Social entrepreneur(s) based the
choice on their previous
professional experience.
Personal 27




to prove it was possible to
address their mission and
make money.
Personal 13
7. Fit with Product The legal structure was perceived to
be a good match for the good/
service provided.
Strategic 8
8. Never Considered an
Alternative
Social entrepreneur(s) never
considered other legal registration
options.
Personal 7
9. Need to be
Understood
The legal structure would help
position the organization in a way
that stakeholders would deem
legitimate.
Strategic 7
10. Advice from Others Social entrepreneur(s) followed
advice offered by those close to
them.
Personal 4
11. Generate Revenue The legal structure allowed for
effective revenue generation.
Strategic 2
12. Need for Flexibility Social entrepreneur(s) selected a
legal structure they felt gave most
flexibility.
Strategic/Personal 2
13. Tax Considerations The legal structure offered specific
tax advantages.
Strategic 1
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Need to Raise Capital
Like most enterprises, securing capital was a crucial part of the start-up strat-
egy for hybrids we examined. When one is prompted to think about raising capital,
venture capitalists, debt financing, or (in the early stages) friends and family come
to mind. Donations, grants, or other philanthropic funding are not traditionally
thought of as capital. This driver predominantly resulted in social entrepreneurs
choosing for-profit structures; however, several nonprofits we studied viewed
grants and philanthropic funding sources as “socialized capital” that would help
them fund early research and development or spread start-up risk. Embrace pro-
vides one example where founders initially chose a nonprofit structure to access
philanthropic capital. Embrace is a 501(c)(3) that developed a low-cost infant
warmer designed for low-weight (and potentially hypothermic) babies in develop-
ing countries. Embrace donates the infant warmers, and provides education to
health care workers and mothers about the care of low-weight babies. The infant
warmer does not require electricity and costs a fraction of what traditional incuba-
tors cost to produce. One of the founders, Jane Chen, shared that she chose a non-
profit structure because:
“The idea was so early that it’s hard to find venture capitalists with that level of risk
appetite, especially given that the returns on this are just not going to look like a
traditional medical device company. And so I think it would have been extremely
difficult to raise that kind of money that early on.”
The nonprofit structure allowed Embrace access to grants and donors that
did not expect the economic returns that venture capitalists would have sought.
Alternatively, one of the main reasons Gillian Henker founded her medical device
company Sisu Global Health as a for-profit was to attract investors; though she
registered it as an L3C in the hope it would also allow the company to apply for
grants. Sisu Global Health was created to address infant and maternal mortality
in the developing world, and by working with physicians at the Komfo Anokye
Teaching Hospital in Ghana has created products that include a blood transfusion
device, a low-cost infant respirator, and a multi-functional labor and delivery bed.
Enterprises whose legal structures were selected primarily to facilitate raising
capital were some of the most likely to change legal structure in our sample.
Fit with Founder Values or Identity
The third important driver of initial choice of legal structure was a purely
personal one—the perceived fit of a structure with founders’ values or identity.
Hybrids whose legal structure was selected based on fit with founders’ values and
identity were some of the least likely to change structure in our sample. Matthew
Manos’ company, verynice, is a good example of this. verynice is a for-profit design,
innovation, and business consultancy based in Los Angeles that completes 50%
of its work pro-bono for nonprofits. After first considering starting a nonprofit,
Manos founded verynice as a for-profit because remaining independent of
donations and grants was important to him:
“My intention was to be 100% pro bono and to basically thrive off donations and
support from grants and so on. But what I realized was that I really wanted to be
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self-sustaining and so I wanted to actually not have to rely on others to help me….
I became really fascinated by the concept of social enterprise…and that was a turn-
ing point where I realized…there are these models out there where you can still
give back but you can be for-profit so that you can sustain yourself and just be inde-
pendent. I really was attracted to the idea of being independent.”
According to its website, verynice has donated over $1 million in pro-bono
design and consulting services to over 200 nonprofits, and is expanding its impact
by making its business model available to others through a book called How to Give
Half of Your Work Away for Free (available online or in print at givehalf.co).
Perceived Expedience
A number of social entrepreneurs founded for-profit hybrids because they
wanted to move quickly toward their goals and avoid the red tape they perceived
was associated with nonprofit models. These founders portrayed nonprofit models
as bureaucratic and administratively cumbersome, so avoided them if they
thought there was a chance of earning their own revenue. Social Conscience, a
Canadian soccer ball company is one such example. James Milligan, the founder
of Social Conscience, had studied sustainability and wanted to ensure his com-
pany would benefit communities in Pakistan where his soccer balls are made.
He manufactures through the Fair Trade model, which adds a premium to the
price of each ball to pay workers a living wage and establish worker representa-
tion to avoid worker exploitation. Milligan thinks of the arrangement as providing
“funding for social programs from every ball,” as the premiums have contributed
to initiatives such as buying school supplies, providing fresh water to schools, and
providing eye and diabetes examinations. Milligan concurred with other for-prof-
its driven by perceived expedience when he said:
“I don’t know what’s involved with not-for-profit paperwork but I’ve got to believe
it’s more complicated than the for-profit paperwork…I didn’t want to get too com-
plicated about it…If I was to go back and look at it now anyway and start all over, I
would still do it as for-profit…not to throw nonprofits under the bus when I say
that; they obviously have a place in the market and a very necessary place.”
Perceived expedience blends strategic and personal rationales because while
social entrepreneurs sought to expedite their strategies, their perceptions are per-
sonal. Social entrepreneurs’ perceptions of expedience were not usually grounded
in experience, which sets this driver apart from the next driver (below) focusing
on the previous experience of the founder (there was only one case where per-
ceived expedience was cited as a primary decision driver alongside previous experi-
ence of the founder). In the above case, Milligan specifically indicated that he did
not “know what was involved with not-for-profit paperwork.” However, perceived
expedience was frequently cited alongside the desire to facilitate the mission,
suggesting that social entrepreneurs are not only seeking the best legal structure
to facilitate their mission, but also one that will allow them to do it expeditiously.
Previous Experience of the Founder
The previous experience of founders was another driver factoring into the
legal structure decision. This driver has a personal rationale, where some founders
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chose a structure because it concurred with their previous experience, while others
went against their previous experience. On one hand, Alicia Vanderschuere wanted
to leverage her experience in the retail world:
“It was always going to be for-profit with a social consciousness piece…My experi-
ence is in corporate America and I’m really great with product, that’s what I enjoy
and for me it was just a natural transition for me to come up with the for-profit side
and to pursue that.”
As a result, Vanderschuere’s enterprise, RosieMADE, is a for-profit online
store selling a variety of products made in the U.S. by women-owned businesses.
Her aim is to increase the influence of women-owned businesses.
On the other hand, Rachel Zadeck had previously worked in nonprofits
and was determined to avoid it when she established the Backpack Farm Agricul-
tural Program (BPF). BPF provides a program of training and agricultural kits that
help African families earn income, build skills, and feed themselves through con-
servation farming. Zadeck’s goal is to improve food security among African
nations; basing herself in Kenya. Zadeck had previously witnessed the limitations
of food aid and stated, “I was planning to be a for-profit company. I had worked in
the aid sector. I had worked in the U.N. I didn’t want to be aid.” She went on to
describe why:
“I have done 13 years’ work in post-conflict countries…I was one day standing on a
runway in southern Sudan in the middle of nowhere and a lot of food drops… about
1,000 people over the next two hours sort of emerged out of the dust storm of the
bush; and mostly women with children strapped to them and began to pick up
50-100 kilogram bags of maize meal or beans. And women were coming up to me
and crying and trying to hand me their dead children and something in me
broke…[I read] the research understanding the deficiencies of the food system, the
expense of it…if we could give women bags of food that they may not even culturally
want to eat and less than 2% of it meets nutritional requirements other than caloric
intake, why could we not try to better package things that could help these women?”
What Drives Legal Structure Change?
Management scholars have rarely studied legal structure change; however,
we found it was quite common in the hybrid organizations we studied—occurring
in half the cases we examined, and in some cases multiple times. Dan Macombie
of Runa was not alone in describing an evolution of legal structure that involved
multiple stages. InVenture, a hybrid organization providing entrepreneurs in devel-
oping countries with financial skills and capital, is another example. CEO and
Founder of InVenture, Shivani Siroya, told us that she first registered InVenture as
a nonprofit in California, then registered a separate for-profit thinking the venture
would be wholly for-profit, and ultimately settled on a mixed-entity hybrid that
has both for-profit and nonprofit 501(c)(3) entities. Siroya reported that after regis-
tering the for-profit, “We thought, ‘Oh, we’re not going to do anythingwith our non-
profit side,’ and then realized that we actually had a need for it…We actually went
back and forth and then finally landed on a [mixed-entity] hybrid model.”
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Eleven drivers underpinned legal structure change, and these are ranked in
Table 4. While the set of drivers is similar to that in Table 3, there are nuanced
differences in what drivers represent at each decision point (we explain these
below). In comparison to Table 3, which shows the top four drivers being most
influential (as indicated by their weighted scores), Table 4 shows that changes
to legal structure were predominantly influenced by the top two drivers. The
other notable difference between the two tables is that while there was a balance
between personal and strategic rationales driving initial legal structure choice, sig-
nificantly more change drivers were strategic; likely the product of their being
grounded in experience rather than perception. The top drivers of legal structure
change are explained below.
Desire to Better Facilitate the Mission
The desire to better facilitate the mission was a prevalent driver among
hybrids altering their structure. This driver was most common among for-profits that
TABLE 4. Drivers of Legal Structure Changes
Driver Definition Strategic or
Personal?
Weighted Score
1. Desire to Better
Facilitate Mission
A change in legal structure
would better support the
mission of the organization.
Strategic 44
2. Need to Raise
Capital
A change in legal structure
would allow additional capital
to be raised more effectively.
Strategic 19
3. Need to be
Understood
A change in legal structure
would more clearly position




4. Need to Diversify
Income
A change in legal structure
would allow for the generation




A change in legal structure
would allow the organization





A change in legal structure
would enable social entrepreneur(s)
to prove it was possible to address










8. Fit with Founder
Values or Identity
Social entrepreneur(s)
changed the legal structure to align
more closely with their values and/
or identity.
Personal 2
(continued on next page)
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became mixed-entity hybrids where social entrepreneurs believed it would enable
them to either enhance or stay true to their mission, or maintain control over their
charitable contributions. For instance, RosieMADE was in the process of adding a
nonprofit to the existing for-profit. Vanderschuere intends that “2%of every salewill
be diverted over to the foundation and then the foundation will have the ability…to
help women with their endeavors” (women who are building their own craft busi-
nesses), and she wanted more control over how donations would be used and a
closer relationship with beneficiaries:
“I considered the possibility of just doing charitable contributions but then I felt like
the organization wouldn’t necessarily have final say in how the money was being
spent and I really liked the idea of being able to interact on a more personal level
with the people who are seeking out funds.”
Need to Raise Capital
The need to raise capital was the second most important driver of legal
structure change. The trend towards hybridization was evident in this driver as
it made strategic sense for enterprises such as InVenture, Sisu Global Health and
Embrace to alter their structures to access new sources of capital. In an end-of-
year letter sent to Embrace supporters in 2012, the organization shared that it
was adding a C-Corporation to its existing nonprofit:
“Our new structure will enable us to more rapidly access the capital needed to
achieve our overall core objective: saving the lives of babies…By securing new
sources of investment funding from private investors and socially minded venture
capital firms, Embrace Innovations will be able to more quickly and effectively
accomplish these activities, and bring our lifesaving healthcare technologies to those
who most need them.”
Under the new structure, the nonprofit Embrace owns the intellectual
property for the low-cost infant warmer, while the for-profit Embrace Innovations
is responsible for manufacturing, distributing and selling the infant warmer. This
model gives Embrace scope to donate infant warmers to clinics in the most
TABLE 4. Drivers of Legal Structure Changes (continued from previous page)
Driver Definition Strategic or
Personal?
Weighted Score
9. Need for Flexibility Social entrepreneur(s) switched





10. Need for Control Social entrepreneur(s) switched





11. Reduce Costs of
Doing Business
A change in legal structure
offered an opportunity to reduce
business expenses.
Strategic 1
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poverty-stricken areas while earning license fees from sales made by Embrace
Innovations.
Need to be Understood
It was important to the social entrepreneurs we interviewed that their hybrids
appear legitimate in the eyes of investors, regulators, and customers. This driver was
strategic and was cited alongside either “desire to better facilitate the mission” or
“need to raise capital” drivers. It predominantly resulted in switches to or within
the for-profit category. We use the term “need to be understood” to label this
driver, because the word “understood”was used by interviewees when describing
what drove them to change structures. For instance, one interviewee who chose
to remain anonymous mentioned their hybrid switched from nonprofit to
mixed-entity, because:
“It allowed us to bring in outside investors and it was something that the outside
investment world understood and was comfortable with… It meant that in the eyes
of the federal government we were easily understood.”
Similarly, after initially establishing an L3C, Sisu Global Health changed to
C-Corporation to raise capital after realizing that it was not “getting as much out
of the L3C as we initially anticipated” in terms of grant funding because neither
foundations or investors understood the L3C structure yet, while C-Corporations
were better understood by traditional investors.
The need to be understood also appeared as a lower-ranking driver of ini-
tial structural choice, where it differed in that it chiefly drove social entrepreneurs
to establish nonprofits so their enterprise would be understood by partners,
donors, the public, and beneficiaries. Dan Macombie’s earlier statement that
Runa’s original nonprofit was started to host the supply chain in the belief that
this “was necessary for communicating our social mission to farmers” exemplifies
this. In aggregate, the changing nature of this driver between initial choice and
structural change decisions reflects the different mixes of stakeholders from
whom social entrepreneurs were seeking legitimacy, and underscores the shift
in the driver becoming more strategic in nature.
Need to Diversify Income
The need to diversify income predominantly arose as nonprofit hybrids
focused on strategies to earn more revenue. This driver is distinct from the need
to raise capital, in which hybrids focused on accessing pools of investment or phil-
anthropic money. This driver typically resulted in nonprofits becoming mixed-
entity hybrids as they developed new goods and services or accessed new markets
through the for-profit entity. MTI IBD had already added a number of services to
its portfolio with the explicit aim to “employ more [veterans] and bring in greater
revenues,” and intended that a for-profit would enable them to access main-
stream markets. CEO Wendell Knight explained that:
“Presently we have the driving range…two cafes plus catering that we do…We
are adding a putting green plus a mini golf course to it, which will employ more
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veterans and plus the greenhouse…Also wanting to be able to put in our gourmet
vegetables and herbs so we can cater more to the restaurants…We get a lot of
catering now and that will be enhanced and we will be more competitive.”
MTI IBD’s drive to expand its market to increase revenue through a for-
profit entity was not unusual among nonprofits as they designed for-profit busi-
nesses to support the nonprofit.
Need for Expedience
Expedience was a mid-ranking driver of both initial choice of structure
and structural change. As a driver of initial choice structural choice, expedience
surrounded perceived inefficiencies embedded within nonprofit structures.
However, as a driver of structural change it was somewhat different. The first
difference is that this driver was based on experience rather than perceptions,
as entrepreneurs had learned what structural options were optimal for achiev-
ing their goals, and why their current structure was not. The change in the
nature of this driver moves it closer to the initial choice driver “previous expe-
rience of founder;” however, we have not renamed it because as Table 4 shows,
“previous experience of founder” also drove structural change and changed in
nature as social entrepreneurs switched legal structures to fit their previous
experience.
The second difference is that the driver became strategic in nature rather
than encapsulating a mixed personal—strategic rationale. One anonymous social
entrepreneur initially registered their hybrid as a for-profit in the U.S. though
it conducted all business in Mali. They realized it would be more expedient to
re-register in Mali because foreign companies had fewer legal protections and
were taxed at a higher rate. This hybrid was one that changed structure but
remained in the for-profit category—shifting from a U.S.-based LLC to become
a Mali-based LLC.
The third difference is that entrepreneurs switched to or established non-
profits because they found them more expedient. In some instances, founders
had switched to or added a nonprofit because it proved more expedient after
initially choosing for-profit because it was perceived more expedient. One such
hybrid was benevola—Ben Aymé founded benevola as a for-profit company
that matches people to volunteering opportunities based on their professional
skills and talents. One reason Aymé initially established a for-profit was that it
was perceived as the more expedient option for his goals. At the time of inter-
view, however, he was planning the addition of a nonprofit to address technical
difficulties he experienced being a pass-through for charities that benevola sup-
ported in addition to the skills-matching service:
“When we started we did set up donations to the causes that we work for…
So as a novice we do that direct, but the next phase is to set up a foundation
for that, to have a special vehicle for that…I could not find a global partner so
I thought, ‘It’s probably easier to set up our own foundation, which will have
much more flexibility and not be restrained to lose a few percent here and
there.’”
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Concluding Insights and Recommendations
Over the course of this inquiry into what drives initial and subsequent
choices of legal structure among hybrid organizations, three core insights emerged
that offer practical advice for social entrepreneurs and businesses looking to col-
laborate with hybrid organizations or wanting to go beyond the scope of current
CSR initiatives. The first insight surrounds the need for hybrids to remain flexible
so they can continue to serve their mission while remaining economically viable.
Our second insight surrounds the decision-making of hybrids becoming strategic
over time as the legal structure becomes the vehicle through which social entre-
preneurs balance economic and social goals. Our third insight points to ways that
traditional firms can utilize structural flexibility themselves to push CSR and cor-
porate sustainability efforts forward.
Hybrids Desire Flexibility
If one word could encapsulate what social entrepreneurs seek by the
changes they make to their enterprises it is flexibility. The hybrid organization
landscape is quickly evolving as options in legal structure grow, and social entre-
preneurs are choosing and changing legal structures to give their enterprise more
flexibility in how they deliver on their mission and remain financially viable. The
need for flexibility was mentioned specifically in only a few cases (ranking 12th in
Table 3 and 9th in Table 4); however, a holistic view of our results indicates that—
when needed—social entrepreneurs will alter their legal structure to gain any
flexibility they need. Social entrepreneurs use this flexibility for two main pur-
poses, which are reflected in the two highest-ranking drivers affecting initial
structure decisions and decisions to change structure. First, social entrepreneurs
are choosing and switching legal structures to further their mission so they have
the option to better control their philanthropic efforts (e.g., RosieMADE), work
with particular types of partners (e.g., Souktel), or to start work that lies outside
the confines of existing grant, philanthropic or partnership arrangements (e.g.,
MTI IBD). The second use of flexibility by hybrids is to increase their options for
raising investment and philanthropic capital, as was the case with Embrace and
Sisu Global Health. In relation to raising capital, structural flexibility was also use-
ful in helping entrepreneurs to overcome their initial misjudging of funding sour-
ces. Sisu Global Health initially established an L3C to appeal to both investors and
philanthropists, but after experiencing a lack of understanding about the L3C
form among both groups, it switched to C-Corporation to appeal to traditional
medical device investors.
Social entrepreneurs and their partners should carefully consider the need
for and implications of structural flexibility. In the beginning of this article, we
suggested that switching structures might alter the value proposition of partner-
ships. Figure 1 showed that the need for flexibility is leading to mixed-entity
hybrids becoming common. The mixed-entity structure enables great flexibility,
since it facilitates various configurations of ownership, management of assets
and intellectual property, transfer of economic value, risk allocation, and gover-
nance. However, delineating access and fair compensation between the entities
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can be complex since it is often facilitated by contracts. Sidebar 3 explains the
configurations among mixed-entity structures as they appeared in our sample.
Sidebar 3. The Inner Workings of Mixed-Entity
Hybrid Organizations
For-Profit Donates Cash to Nonprofit—One popular configuration
is for the for-profit to support the nonprofit by donating to it some or all
of the profit. One enterprise we studied working towards this was Pink
Wish Foundation, a U.S. nonprofit working to stop self-destructive behav-
ior and economic distress among girls aged 8–18. At the time of interview,
Pink Wish Foundation was in the midst of establishing a for-profit to sell
cosmetics that would “make the contributions that we have vowed to
make to keep going.” MTI IBD and RosieMADE are other examples. In
some cases, such as MTI IBD, the for-profit may also provide work for
beneficiaries. This configuration was popular among hybrids wanting to
provide the nonprofit with a steady stream of revenue, and those that
wanted to retain more control over how donations were used. Though
it was not a strong driver among our data, a further benefit surrounds
the for-profit and external donors receiving tax benefits for their dona-
tions. This configuration shares some similarity (though not typically in size
or level of mutual engagement in operations) with corporations that cre-
ate a separate entity to manage some or all of their philanthropic activities,
as is the case with Dow Chemical Company and The Dow Chemical
Company Foundation.
Nonprofit Distributes For-Profit’s Products to Humanitarian
Markets—Another popular configuration emerged where nonprofits
would facilitate the distribution of the for-profit’s products to humanitarian
markets for free or at subsidized rates. This was the case with Souktel,
which became a mixed-entity so it could collaborate with aid organizations
and implement its text-based technology for humanitarian purposes more
effectively. This structure can enhance the ability of a hybrid to establish
partnerships with NGOs and governmental aid agencies that already have
expertise, credibility, and established distribution channels in a given mar-
ket. This configuration can also increase the scale of production for the
for-profit (which may be selling the same products at a premium in differ-
ent markets), and such relationships can be implemented using typical
product pricing and distribution agreements.
Nonprofit Owns Shares in the For-Profit—In this configuration, the
nonprofit retains a shareholding in the for-profit. In our sample, this config-
uration provided the nonprofit with dividend income; however, other rea-
sons for adopting it include ensuring the nonprofit has a role in governing
the for-profit (if the shareholding is large) and tax benefits the for-profit will
receive for any donations. An example of this configuration from our
continued on next page
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sample comes from Ubuntu Bikes, a hybrid based in South Africa that
builds and restores unique bicycles. The for-profit Ubuntu Bikes hires local
vendors (often charities) to provide bicycles, artwork, and accessories. The
nonprofit side (Ubuntu Trust) has a 20% shareholding in Ubuntu Bikes and
uses the income to support local charities.
Nonprofit Owns Intellectual Property Licensed by the For-
Profit—Hybrids developing intellectual property have the option of sit-
uating intellectual property associated with the mission in the nonprofit.
Embrace established this configuration to develop its medical device
using grant and philanthropic funding prior to establishing the for-profit
Embrace Innovations to manufacture and sell the device. Other reasons
for establishing this configuration might include providing the nonprofit
with income via license fees from sales by the for-profit. In these cases,
the nonprofit may also have a shareholding in the for-profit to provide
structure for governance oversight to ensure fair compensation to the
nonprofit for its development of assets.
The descriptions in Sidebar 3 show how the drivers of structural change
can influence the relationship between nonprofit and for-profit entities, and sub-
sequently which entity will manage various assets, risks, costs, and operations.
The result may enhance or detract from the value of a partnership, or even negate
the hybrid’s need for a partnership. Basic considerations are which entities will be
party to the partnership, and what aspects of the enterprise will reside within
which entity. Addressing these considerations prior to partnering with a mixed-
entity hybrid will help to avoid perceived or real misallocation of costs and bene-
fits, which is a common issue among social alliances.19
More generally, companies should research potential hybrid partners thor-
oughly to determine whether they are likely to change their legal structure, and
what impact a change might have on the ability of the partnership to deliver its
intended outcomes. Our results suggest that knowing whether the initial structure
was chosen for personal reasons (such as fit with founders’ values) as opposed to
strategic reasons (like the need to raise capital) can inform companies of the likeli-
hood of future change in the hybrid. Though the incidence of change in our entire
sample was 50%, those legal structures initially driven by predominantly personal
reasons appeared slightly more resistant to legal structure change (e.g., 45% of
structures driven by fit with founders’ values changed), while those initially driven
by strategic reasons were more likely to change (e.g., 75% of structures chosen to
fit with a product, and 65% of structures chosen to raise capital). Any company
considering entering a partnership with a hybrid organization should have explicit
conversations with its leadership to understand what is driving their structural
choices and their commitment to the current structure.
Similarly, social entrepreneurs designing or redesigning their enterprise
should consider potential benefits and risks that a given structure and alterations to
it may carry for its partners and partnerships. In particular, thought should be given
to how legal structure change may affect identified building blocks of partnerships.20
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For instance, would a change to the hybrid’s legal structure affect the ability of
parties to build collective strength? Would a change to the hybrid’s legal structure
affect the legitimacy of parties or the partnership in the eyes of important stake-
holders? Would a change to the hybrid’s legal structure affect the desired level
of interdependence between parties? Would a change to the hybrid’s legal struc-
ture create conflict?
Hybrids Become More Strategic over Time
The second insight is evident when comparing Table 3 and Table 4, which
is that, in aggregate, decisions surrounding legal structure become increasingly
strategic over time. In our sample, a balance of personal and strategic drivers
drove initial structural choices, while changes to legal structure were more likely
to be strategic. We also observed the expedience-related driver becoming strategic
in orientation between the two decision points. This reflects experience gained by
social entrepreneurs about how their enterprise can work within the landscape of
stakeholders, available structures, and mixed-entity hybrid configurations to
deliver on their mission and remain economically viable. One lesson learned by
many social entrepreneurs surrounded the need for—and opportunities available
through—partnerships. Changes to structure were often undertaken to enter a
partnership or in anticipation of partnerships—Souktel’s establishment of a non-
profit to develop software with NGOs is a clear example of this. The key insight here
is that should a corporate partner be of sufficient potential benefit, hybrid organiza-
tions should be willing to adapt their structure, and companies should not overlook
a potential partner because its current legal structure is not appealing.
Our results also suggest that social entrepreneurs are learning how to strike
a balance between social and economic goals. Previous studies have focused on the
challenges21 of managing humanitarian and market objectives22 and have found
that hybrids demonstrate dual identities to manage tensions between the two.23
Given the two most prevalent drivers across both decision points surrounded facili-
tating the mission and raising capital, we expected to find the same tensions
expressed in our cases; however, we found a noteworthy absence of such tensions
in the 48 hybrids we studied. This leads us to conclude that while scholars focus on
such tensions, social entrepreneurs focus on solutions to them, and changes to legal
structure may be one manifestation of such solutions.
Traditional Companies Can Hybridize
Our third insight is an implication of our results; namely, that a focus on
flexibility need not only be the preserve of social entrepreneurs, because traditional
companies can also use a flexible approach to their own legal structure to push their
CSR or corporate sustainability initiatives forward. Structuring a company to diver-
sify and solidify its access to markets, revenue, and financing is a familiar practice of
corporate directors, while engaging with social and environmental issues already
lies squarely within the scope of work performed by CSR and sustainability
managers. Further, some corporations already have a long history of creating
separate nonprofit entities to manage their philanthropy, as we mentioned in
Sidebar 3. Based on these existing skills and experience, hybridizing a traditional
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for-profit firm may be viable where leaders want to move beyond (or add to)
partnerships with nonprofits and deepen their engagement with social and
environmental issues affecting their stakeholders, or to gain more flexibility or
control in the implementation of existing CSR initiatives.
A for-profit executive might think that establishing a nonprofit organiza-
tion would be an obvious choice for a hybridizing a for-profit business, and if that
is the case, the information in Sidebar 3 can assist in designing the relationship
between the firm and a new nonprofit entity. Leaders considering the addition
of a nonprofit must ensure they are aware of the essential aspects of nonprofit
management, since nonprofit structures are more restrictive and more regulated
than for-profit structures. A thorough analysis and implementation plan specify-
ing the separation of assets, costs, resources, and activities is critical.
However, several of our cases had established additional entities of the same
type as the original entity (see the shaded areas of Figure 1), and there are well-
known examples (but not in our sample) where corporations have added mis-
sion-driven for-profits to their portfolio. One example is Google’s philanthropic
organization http://Google.org, which was established as a for-profit to provide
flexibility for undertaking such initiatives as funding start-ups.24 Another example
is Groupe Danone’s merger with Stonyfield Farm. The Groupe Danone/Stonyfield
Farm merger exemplifies a degree of hybridization by merger, and it suggests ways
that firms can hybridize and pursue their normal range of corporate goals—such as
entering new markets, developing new products, and maximizing innovation and
market share. Groupe Danone targeted Stonyfield Farm because it was grappling
with its environmental management priorities and wanted to reduce carbon emis-
sions, and Stonyfield Farm’s Founder and CEO Gary Hirshberg was on the cutting
edge of thought leadership in the U.S. dairy industry.25 Stonyfield Farm began in
1983 as a nonprofit organic farming school aiming to “help family farms survive,
keep food and food production healthy, and help protect the environment.”26
Stonyfield Farm produced organic yoghurt to fund the school, before becoming a
for-profit company producing organic dairy products. In 2001, Groupe Danone
began a progressive merger that would see it acquire 80% of Stonyfield Farm by
2003.27 Members of the social enterprise community were initially critical of the
merger, citing fears that Stonyfield Farm’s “commitment to sustainability would
likely be toned down;” however, it has benefited both companies. Since the
merger, Groupe Danone has expanded its commitment to sustainable food chain
management, developed plant-based packaging, acquired further organic dairy
companies, and launched Stonyfield Europe to provide organic alternatives to
Groupe Danone’s other European brands.28 While we leave it to future research
to examine such transitions, our findings about what drives entrepreneurs to
choose one structure over another may help any leaders considering hybridization
make the choice between for-profit and nonprofit for a new entity.
Hybrid organizations are adapting their legal structure to optimize their abil-
ity to succeed in complex and dynamic environments. Social entrepreneurs do not
view legal structure as fixed, but rather as a variable aspect of their enterprise that
can shift to better facilitate the mission, raise capital, gain legitimacy, diversify
income, or expedite any or all of these. Entrepreneurs and managers of non-hybrid
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firms can leverage hybrid structures to advance their current CSR program or
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